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Abstract 
This paper explores the role of international reserves as a stabilizer of international capital 
flows during periods of global financial stress. In contrast with previous contributions, aimed 
at explaining net capital flows, we focus on the behavior of gross capital flows. We analyze 
an extensive cross-country quarterly database using event analyses and standard panel 
regressions. We document significant heterogeneity in the response of resident investors to 
financial stress and relate it to a previously undocumented channel through which reserves 
are useful during financial stress. International reserves facilitate financial disinvestment 
overseas by residents, offsetting the simultaneous drop in foreign financing. 
Keywords: Gross capital flows, international reserves, systemic crises, capital retrenchment. 
JEL Classification: F21, F32, F33. 
 
 
  
Resumen 
Este trabajo estudia el papel de las reservas internacionales como una fuerza estabilizadora  
de los flujos de capital internacionales durante períodos de estrés global. A diferencia de 
contribuciones anteriores, centradas en estudiar los flujos de capital netos, este trabajo se centra 
en el comportamiento de los flujos de capital brutos. Mediante el uso de técnicas de panel y 
análisis de eventos analizamos una base de datos trimestrales con una amplia cobertura 
geográfica. Nuestros resultados muestran una marcada heterogeneidad en la respuesta de los 
inversores residentes a períodos de estrés, y relacionan dicha heterogeneidad con un canal para 
el que hasta la fecha no había evidencia empírica: las reservas internacionales facilitan la 
repatriación del capital que los inversores residentes tienen depositado en otros países, lo cual 
compensa la caída en la financiación internacional que se observa durante estos eventos. 
Palabras claves: Flujos brutos de capital, reservas internacionales, crisis sistémicas, 
repatriación de capital. 
Códigos JEL: F21, F32, F33. 
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1 Introduction 
The world economy has, in recent decades, experienced a process of global financial 
integration, with large increases in cross-border capital flows in both emerging and developed 
economies. The process has been far from smooth. As shown in Graph 1, where episodes of 
global financial stress (as defined in section 2) are depicted with an unbroken blue line, cross-
border capital flows have been increasing, grinding abruptly to a halt during the 1995-1996, 
1998-1999 and 2001-2002 episodes of turmoil. Each time, they resumed soon afterwards, 
reaching their peak at the onset of the 2008 global economic crisis. After their sharp collapse, 
financial flows are on a rising trend again. The picture is one of waves of increasing integration 
followed by episodes of sudden reductions in cross-border flows.1 
While countries, in particular emerging economies, can benefit from foreign savings, 
they can also be severely affected by episodes of disruption in cross-border capital flows. In 
fact, strong capital inflows can lead to exchange rate misalignments, foster credit booms and 
currency mismatches and are subject to sudden stops, namely sharp reductions in cross-
border flows. These can, in turn, trigger strong exchange rate depreciations and even bank 
runs (see Jeanne, 2010). 
Against this background, the challenge for policy makers lies in reaping the benefits 
of financial integration while managing these risks. Episodes of high capital flows to emerging 
economies have been managed with an eclectic approach. Macro-prudential policies and 
capital controls have sometimes been used during the upswing to prevent credit booms  
and financial instability. Even more often, in particular in the past decade, foreign reserve 
accumulation by Central Banks has been used to prevent excessive exchange rate 
misalignments and build up buffers against eventual sudden stops (see Ostry et al., 2011).2 
Graph 1 presents simple country averages of the dynamic behavior of gross capital flows and 
reserve accumulation. It strongly suggests that reserve accumulation policies have been in 
place, particularly in the run-up to the last crisis. 
 
 
                                                                          
1. A similar picture emerges from Broner et al. (2011) and Forbes and Warnock (2011). 
2. Durdu et al. (2009) presents a general equilibrium model of reserve accumulation. It rationalizes the buildup of large 
stocks of foreign reserves as a precautionary behavior in an environment where credit constraints can lead to sudden 
capital stops. 
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Indeed, after the recent crisis, international reserve holdings are rocketing again in 
emerging economies. They surpassed 9 trillion dollars in 2010, well above the 7.5 trillion 
dollars at the onset of the crisis. Emerging economies’ international reserves have climbed 
from 5 trillion dollars before the crisis to close to 6 trillion dollars. According to Jeanne and 
Ranciere (2009), leaving aside China, reserve accumulation in emerging economies might 
be explained to an important extent by precautionary motives, the threat of a reversal on 
capital inflows. 
A striking fact underlining these developments is that, despite a lack of hard 
evidence, there is a growing consensus among policy makers that holding large stocks of 
foreign reserves pays off.3 Moreover, there is mounting evidence that this policy might impose 
significant externalities and have major costs for the world economy (IMF, 2010). With this 
paper we aim to provide additional elements to evaluate the advisability of reserve 
accumulation by analyzing its effect on the behavior of cross-border investors, either 
domestic or foreign, during periods of systemic financial stress.4 This is in contrast to the 
empirical literature on the issue, which has focused mostly on the impact of reserves on either 
foreign flows or net capital flows. For instance, Obstfeld (2011) argues that international 
reserves are held to prevent foreign capital flight and, thus, relate to the countries’ 
international liabilities. By placing our focus also on resident investors, we follow a recent 
strand of literature that has suggested that international reserves are held at least partly to 
prevent and mitigate domestic capital flight. Obtsfeld et al. (2008) show that international 
reserves depend on the economy’s M2, which, they argue, can be seen as a proxy of  
the resources which residents can invest overseas.5  
The literature has, so far, found contradictory evidence regarding the ability of 
international reserves to lower substantially the probability of experiencing sudden stop. 
According to Calvo (2007), sudden stops of capitals are best prevented by orthodox 
domestic policies and limited balance-sheet vulnerabilities, with international reserves playing 
an indirect role. Edwards (2007) argues that international reserves play a minor role in 
avoiding sudden stops. Calvo et al. (2008) suggest that international reserve holdings could 
both prevent a sudden stop by mitigating exchange rate depreciation and act as a buffer in 
the event of experiencing such a stop. Along the same lines, IMF (2006) emphasizes that 
international reserves are a relevant tool for self-insuring against external shocks. In contrast, 
García and Soto (2004) find a strong negative relationship between the level of international 
reserves and the probability of sudden stops. 
Using net flows can, however, be misleading. Consider a sudden stop episode – a 
sharp reduction in net financial flows- and the consequent increase in financing needs. Does it 
reflect a reduction in overseas investment or an increase in investment overseas by residents? 
Along these lines, a few recent papers show that the underlying drivers of net financial flows 
are better understood if the data is divided into gross foreign inflows (i.e. financial investment 
in the country by non-residents) and gross domestic outflows (i.e. financial investment abroad 
by residents). Rothenberg and Warnock (2011) show that many sudden stop episodes were 
                                                                          
3. IMF (2011) analyzes the level of reserves worldwide using a variety of reserve adequacy indicators. According to their 
preferred metric most countries hold an excessive amount of foreign reserves. 
4. A related strand of the literature, instead of focusing on the benefits of reserve accumulation, studies its determinants. 
For instance, Bastourre et al (2009), using GMM techniques in a panel of emerging countries, find that openness, 
regional imitation, persistence, a U-shaped relationship between reserves and development level, and financial 
deregulation are the factors driving reserve hoarding. They also find that countries with flexible exchange rate regimes 
have higher ratios of reserves to GDP. 
5. Jeanne and Rancière (2009) suggest that considering the level of M2 helps rationalize  high levels of foreign reserves. 
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indeed episodes of resident capital flight and that only a fraction were driven by a contraction 
of gross foreign inflows. In turn, Forbes and Warnock (2011) show that global factors are 
important determinants of both resident and foreign sudden stop episodes and that, although 
domestic macroeconomic characteristics hardly matter, changes in domestic economic 
growth influence episodes of foreign capital flight. Also closely related to our paper, Broner et 
al. (2011) and Cowan et al. (2007) argue that a key difference between developed and 
emerging economies during financial stress lies in the behavior of gross domestic outflows. 
According to Broner et al. (2011), who study the behavior of gross flows along the business 
cycle, during crises, foreign investors flee while domestic investors tend to retrench.6  
We use this “gross approach” to study the impact of international reserve 
accumulation on the behavior of gross capital flows during periods of global stress. We build 
an extensive quarterly database on gross capital flows in which we distinguish the behavior of 
foreign investors in the economy from that of the economy’s resident investors abroad. By 
looking separately at the domestic and foreign components of capital flows we address the 
following questions. Do international reserves play a catalytic role vis-à-vis foreign investors? 
Do they affect the behavior of gross domestic outflows? In light of the literature we perform 
the analysis measuring reserves in terms of both international financial liabilities (a proxy of the 
resources that non-residents can pull out of the country) and M2 (a proxy of the resources 
which residents can pull out of the country). 
Our main results suggest that, while the dynamics of gross foreign inflows during 
global financial stress are not meaningfully affected by the countries’ level of international reserves, 
the dynamics of gross domestic outflows do depend on the level of international 
reserves. During periods of stress, countries with more international reserves experience 
larger drops in gross domestic outflows. International reserves make residents more willing to 
repatriate capitals invested overseas, mitigating the lack of foreign financing. These results 
hold both in international financial liabilities and M2 terms. 
These findings are relevant for at least two reasons. First, by highlighting a previously 
undocumented benefit of reserve holdings, they contribute to improving the design of the 
international financial architecture. This beneficial effect on the behavior of resident investors 
should be an element of any financial safety net designed to limit countries’ incentives to 
accumulate reserves. As such, the exercise also contributes to a growing literature on the 
dynamic behavior of gross capital flows that decomposes capital accounts into operations  
by domestic and foreign investors. Broner et al. (2011) show how during financial stress 
domestic investors reduce the speed at which they accumulate external assets or even 
reduce their external exposure. This behavior is, however, in contrast to the recurrent 
phenomenon of domestic capital flight documented by Rothenberg and Warnock (2011) and 
Forbes and Warnock (2011).7 By showing that international reserves partly explain the 
heterogeneous reaction of resident investors, we reconcile these two pieces of evidence. In 
countries where the Central Bank holds low levels of hard currency, domestic investors are 
more likely to respond to a crisis with domestic capital flight. Although we do not attempt to 
                                                                          
6. Broner et al. (2011) further show that the response to crises of the various capital flow components can be very 
different. 
7. While our approach is similar to that on Broner et al. (2011), there are significant differences between Rothenberg and 
Warnock (2011) and Forbes and Warnock (2011) and our exercise. First, these papers focus on extreme changes in the 
pattern of capital flows, disregarding whether they occur in periods of systemic financial stress. In addition, Rothenberg and 
Warnock (2011) use contractions in monthly international reserves to classify episodes as either capital flight or true sudden 
stops, depending on whether the change in reserves is driven by gross domestic outflows or gross foreign inflows. 
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model it, this fact points to the existence of potential complementarities between the local 
Central Bank and domestic investors.8 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a data description. 
Section 3 presents the empirical exercise along with our main results and a battery of 
robustness checks. Finally, section 4 concludes. 
  
                                                                          
8. Possible explanations are that residents are more willing to repatriate assets when are confident about the strength of 
their currency or about the ability of the authorities to manage financial instability. 
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2 Data 
We construct a database comprising 63 countries for the period 1991-2009. Countries were 
selected according to data availability. Given that some relevant developments may last few 
quarters or that their impact is felt in quarters of different years we use quarterly data. Country 
selection was most constrained by our interest in using quarterly data.9 Our final sample, 
detailed in Annex I, contains 44 developing countries and 19 developed countries.10  
The latter, will, for simplicity, be bundled together in a group defined as “OECD countries”.  
In the rest of this section, we describe the construction of capital flows aggregates; define our 
crises events, construct measures of reserves, and describe how countries are grouped 
according to their level of reserves. 
2.1 Defining gross capital flows aggregates 
Data on financial flows, as reported in Balance of Payment data, comes from the International 
Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund. This source allows for disaggregation 
between financial inflows by foreigners, investments and disinvestments into the receiving 
economy, what we call gross foreign inflows (GFI), and financial outflows by residents, 
investments and disinvestments from the economy to overseas, defined here as gross 
domestic outflows (GDO). Further disaggregation by instruments allows disentangling  
gross flows as international reserves, foreign direct Investment (FDI) flows, portfolio flows and 
other investment flows.  
Using this information we construct the following aggregates in GDP terms. First, we 
define a measure of total financial investments by non-residents in the reporting economy 
(GFI, gross foreign inflows), which includes all three categories: FDI, portfolio inflows and other 
inflows. Second, we define an analogous measure of total financial investments by residents in 
the reporting economy overseas (GDO, gross domestic outflows), excluding central banks’ 
purchases and sales of international reserves.11 Using these two aggregates we construct a 
measure of net capital flows, NF= GFI – GDO.12 Finally, we define short-term gross foreign 
inflows, GFIST, by adding up portfolio and other investment flows by non-residents in the 
reporting economy; and short-term gross domestic outflows, GDOST, using analogous 
information regarding residents’ activity. For all of these variables we construct a four-quarter 
cumulative version,  
             ݔ෤௜௧ ൌ ∑ ݔ௜௧଴௧ୀିଷ  ݓ݄݁ݎ݁  ݔ௜௧= {GFI, GDO, NI, GFIST, GDOST} 
The smoothing of the series using the cumulative measure has two important 
advantages. First, it minimizes the importance of idiosyncratic events. Second, it reduces the 
importance of dating exactly the quarter in which the episode of global financial stress 
unfolds. However, it also entails a cost as it smoothes the importance of the shock. 
                                                                          
9. For instance, the large drop on capital flows in the last quarter of 2008 occurred after several quarters of large inflows. 
Thus, using annual data would hide this sharp contraction. 
10. To avoid their high and volatile flows drive the analysis, we dropped a number of financial centers (Ireland, Iceland, 
Luxembourg or and Hong-Kong). We also excluded China as it only provides flows information in a semi-annual basis. 
11. Due to the nature of the exercise, our GDO measure does not include changes in central banks’ international 
reserves. 
12. NF need not coincide with the current account which also includes errors and omissions and exceptional financing 
items. 
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In the econometric part, we follow Broner et al. (2011) and standardize the series by 
dividing them with their corresponding standard deviation: ݔො௜௧ ൌ ௫෤೔೟ఙഥೣ೔ . This is done to reduce 
the impact on the estimation of the most volatile countries.  
2.2 Event identification 
As in Calvo et al. (2008), we use the Global EMBI+ Index to identify periods of global financial 
stress in EMs. We define periods of global financial stress as those quarters in which the 
Global EMBI+ spread fulfils the following two conditions. First, it jumps two standard 
deviations over its eight-quarter moving average. Additionally, it reaches the maximum in a 
four-quarter window. More precisely: 
 
As shown in Graph 2, this methodology returns four events: the first quarter of 1995, 
the third quarter of 1998, the fourth quarter of 2001 and the fourth quarter of 2008. The 
graph shows the evolution of the EMBI spread, its time-varying mean and a two standard 
deviation window around this mean.  The quarters identified as events are shadowed. 
     
  
While the EMBI-index unquestionably proxies episodes of financial stress in 
emerging economies, Global EMBI fluctuations could simply reflect economic 
developments in large EMs, so that the events identified need not be truly systemic. 
Fortunately, the events identified correspond with episodes which, with a narrative 
approach, could be said as having impacted emerging economies as a whole seriously and 
can, therefore, be considered as global.13  
2.3 Grouping countries according to their reserve level 
There are two broad approaches to assess international reserves adequacy: model-based 
techniques and rules-of-thumb. Models of optimal reserves provide an assessment of 
reserves adequacy taking into account various costs and benefits. Unfortunately, this 
                                                                          
13. Events identified with the EMBI correspond, roughly, to the Tequila, Russian, Argentinean and Lehman crises. We 
also identified events using other global indicators. For instance, applying the same filter to the VIX, the events identified 
are 98Q3, 02Q3, and 08Q4; using the MOBE index, the events identified are 92Q4, 98Q4, 02Q3 and 08Q4. 
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approach is not tractable when working with a large panel of countries as calibration of the 
model’s parameters is very data-demanding (Jeanne and Rancière, 2005). Therefore, we rely 
on rules-of-thumb. 
One of the most popular adequacy rules is the Guidotti-Greenspan rule, according to 
which reserves should cover short-term external liabilities (maturing in less than one year). 
Other rules look at reserves as a fraction of foreign currency liabilities, short term external 
debt, imports or monetary aggregates. There is not agreement on which is the best measure, 
as different measures provide different insights.14 Given this lack of agreement and given our 
focus on the distinct behavior of resident and foreign investors, in this paper we look at the 
level of reserves relative to two distinct measures. 
First we define a measure of the total resources which foreigners can pull out of the 
country –foreign liabilities, as collected by the IMF’s International Investment Position data. 
Additionally, we look at a the level of reserves relative to the domestic monetary aggregate 
M2, which proxies the resources which residents can invest overseas, and takes into account 
the risk of experiencing a capital flight from residents (see Obstfeld et al., 2008). Hence, we 
define the following variables: 
 
tR  stands for international reserves, tIFL  represents the foreign liabilities of the 
country and tM2  stand for the country M2 monetary aggregate. Then, tRX  is a measure of 
reserves relative to either total resources invested in the country by non-residents or  
total resources of residents which could be invested abroad. The ܴܫܨܮ௜௧ rule measures the 
level of reserves relative to potential outflows (disinvestments in the country) from non-
resident. In turn,  ܴܯ2௜௧ measures the level of reserves relative to potential outflows  
from residents (investment overseas by residents). 
Using these reserve ratios, we group our sample countries as follows. Given that 
their higher degree of development implies a limited reliance on international reserves, we 
group OECD countries aside. Additionally, we classify non-OECD economies within one of 
three groups according to their level of reserves at the onset of each period of global financial 
stress. Given the lack of consensus on what an “adequate” level of reserves is we follow a 
pragmatic approach. We create a “low reserves” group (LR) that comprises those countries 
with the 20% lowest reserves, a “high reserves” group (HR) with observations with the 20% 
highest reserves; and a “medium reserves” group (MR) comprising the remaining 
observations: 
ܮܴ௜௧ ൌ ൜1 ݂݅ R_X୧୲ ൏ ݌݁ݎܿ݁݊ݐ݈݅݁ଶ଴
ோூீ
0 ݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁ ൠ 
ܯܴ௜௧ ൌ ൜1 ݂݅ ܴ_ ௜ܺ௧ א ሺ݌݁ݎܿ݁݊ݐ݈݅݁ଶ଴
ோூீ, ݌݁ݎܿ݁݊ݐ଼݈݅݁଴ோூீሻ
0 ݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁ ൠ  
ܪܴ௜௧ ൌ ൜1 ݂݅ ܴ_ ௜ܺ௧ ൐ ݌݁ݎܿ݁݊ݐ଼݈݅݁଴
ோூீ
0 ݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁ ൠ 
                                                                          
14. See IMF (2011) for a recent analysis of some of the most popular rules-of-thumb. 
/   where  { , 2 }.t t t t t tRX R X X IFL M 
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Note that this method classifies countries relative to other countries, so that there are 
always a similar number of countries in each of the groups. Table 1 shows some descriptive 
statistics for each of the groups and episodes. The table underlines an upward trend in 
reserves, especially since the late nineties. Table 2 presents the correlation of our two 
measures of reserves, with each other, but also with two variables which are likely to affect 
reserve accumulation, namely, the credit rating and the exchange rate regime. 15 
C
R/IFL R/M2
Exchange 
rate 
S&P 
rating
R/IFL 1
R/M2 0.57 1.00
Exchange rate regime -0.24 -0.31 1
S&P rating -0.17 -0.32 0.25 1.00
Table 2: Correlations Matrix
Source: Authors' calculations using IMF's and S&P's data. In order to
calculate the correlations the following numerical values were assigned. The 
lowest rating (SD) was assigned a value 0, while the highest rating (AAA)
was assigned a value 20. In turn, the most flexible exchange rate regimes
were  assigned a value 3 and  the  fixed exchange rate regimes a value 1.  
The Table shows relatively low correlations. This suggests that RILF and RM2 might 
provide different insights. Additionally, although we formally test it, the low correlation 
between our reserve indicators and both exchange rate regime and credit rating indicators 
suggest that the results we obtain cannot be solely explained by the relation of reserves with 
any of these two indicators. 
  
                                                                          
15. Exchange rates regimes are classified using the Reinhart and Ilzetki (2008) classification. See Appendix for details. 
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3 International reserves during periods of stress 
In this section we apply a set of econometric techniques, event analyses and panel data 
regressions, to understand to what extent the behavior of gross capital flows can be affected 
by the reserve policy of the corresponding Central Bank. As a first step, we study the average 
behavior of our capital flows measures around periods of financial stress and within each 
reserve group.16 Graphs 3 to 5 in the Appendix show the dynamics of the series four quarters 
before and after the event, with the quarter of the event being defined as t=0. 
Graph 3 shows that, for OECD countries, net financial flows remain roughly flat 
around the events of financial stress. Within non-OECD countries, there are differences 
depending on the level of reserves. They fall substantially in the low reserves group, but are 
more stable in medium and high reserves groups.  The dynamics of gross financial flows  
are shown in Graph 4, where the green solid line represents GFI and the dashed blue line 
GDO.17 Gross financial inflows plunge around periods of financial stress for all four groups. 
Conversely, gross financial outflows contract substantially in OECD countries and high-
reserves non-OECD countries but not in medium-reserve and low-reserve countries. In line 
with Rothenberg and Warnock (2011), it is a combination of reduced external financing and 
increased capital expatriation what underlies the reduction of net flows. Gross short-term 
foreign and domestic flows, shown in Graph 5, have similar dynamics. 
After gaining some intuition about the behavior of our series we move to assess the 
statistical relevance of these movements by means of an event analysis. We will then test, 
using a panel data model, if any of the relations found can be understood in a causal sense. 
3.1 Event Analysis  
In this section we analyze the dynamics of gross flows within each reserve group using an 
event analysis as in Broner et al. (2011). In particular, we investigate whether, depending on 
the relative level of reserves at the onset of the event, financial flows present a different 
behavior around events of financial stress. We estimate the following model: 
(1) ݔො௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߠ௜ ൅ ߩíݐ ൅ ∑ ߚ௝ ܧܸܧܰ ௧ܶା௝ ൅ ߝ௜௧ସ௝ୀିସ  
 
The capital flow variable ݔො௜௧ is regressed on ߠ௜, (country dummies); ߩíݐ (country-
specific time trends), a constant ߙ and a set of dummies, ܧܸܧܰ ௧ܶା௝, constructed to have unit 
value whenever we are j periods away from a systemic crisis. Using this set of dummies we 
can measure the behavior of financial flows in the four quarters before and after our events of 
financial stress. The ߚ௝ coefficients associated with these dummies collect deviations against 
the mean behavior outside the event window under analysis, where this mean behavior is net 
of country-specific and common time trends, and country fixed effects. Besides the point 
estimates, we further compare the behavior of capital flows before and after the event by 
using Wald tests. We check whether capital flow dynamics are significantly different in the 
previous four quarters than in the subsequent four quarters. 
                                                                          
16. Unless stated differently, the results are shown using reserves relative to international financial liabilities. 
17. Note that the difference between gross financial inflows and gross financial outflows does not render net financial 
flows, as each series is standardized by its own standard deviation.  
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We estimate equation (1) separately for OECD countries and non-OECD countries. 
When estimating the model in the sub-sample of non-OECD countries, we combine 
our ܧܸܧܰ ௧ܶା௝ indicators with a set of reserve group dummies which indicate the group of 
reserves (k) to which countries belong at the onset of the financial stress event. After including 
these new indicators, which we denote by ܧܸܧܰ ௧ܶା௝௞ , the model we estimate looks like 
follows:  
(2) ݔො௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߠ௜ ൅ ߩíݐ ൅ ∑ ∑ ߚ௝௞ ܧܸܧܰ ௧ܶା௝௞ ൅ ߤ௞ ൅ ߝ௜௧ସ௝ୀିସ௞   ݓ݅ݐ݄ k ൌ ሼLR, MR, HRሽ 
 
From equation (2) we obtain different a set  ߚ௝௞  of coefficients for each of reserves 
group. Note that we have included reserve group dummies,  ߤ௞, to ensure the desired 
interpretation of the coefficients ߚ௝௞. Again, the coefficients represent deviations against the 
mean behavior out of the window under analysis net of country-specific and common time 
trends, country effects and also reserve group effects.  
The results are presented in Tables 3 to 5. 18 As shown in Table 3, net flows (NF) 
remain flat around the events for OECD countries, while they become significantly lower 
than the average for non-OECD countries shortly after the event. This diverging behavior is 
confirmed by Wald test presented in the bottom of the table. However, as shown  
in columns 2 to 4, there are differences in the behavior of NF depending on the reserves 
group. On the one hand, high-reserve countries do not experience a fall in NF. This is 
shown both by the absence of significant coefficients and by the Wald test, which does not 
reject the hypothesis of equal behavior of NF before and after the event. On the other hand, 
in the low reserves group –and less so, in the medium reserves group- net financial flows 
are significantly lower in some of the quarters after the event, change that is confirmed by 
the corresponding Wald tests. 
Table 4 shows the results for GFI (gross foreign inflows) and GDO (gross domestic 
outflows). Again, the behavior of GFI and GDO is very similar for OECD and non-OECD 
countries as a whole. GFI and GDO are significantly above normal times before the events of 
financial stress and significantly below after them. The Wald tests confirm this change in the 
dynamics of GFI and GDO after the event. While these results suggest a generalized 
retrenchment of both foreign and domestic capital, when the dynamics of GFI and GDO for 
each group of countries is considered, the conclusions are rather different. The dynamics of 
GFI remains very similar no matter the level of reserves; gross foreign inflows tend to fall –
more or less immediately- after a financial shock as shown by the Wald tests that reject the 
identity of coefficients before and after the shock. The picture, however, changes for GDO. In 
high and medium reserve countries, GDO are significantly lower in the quarters after the event 
of financial stress and Wald tests reject the identity of behavior of GDO before and after the 
shock. On the contrary, in low reserve countries, gross domestic outflows become 
significantly higher after the shock. Finally, Table 5 shows the results for short term gross 
inflows (GFIST) and short-term gross domestic outflows (GDOST) with very similar 
conclusions. There is a generalized contraction in GFIST while GDOST fall in all country 
groups but in the low reserves one, where they even become significantly higher than before 
the financial shock. 
 
                                                                          
18. The results are qualitatively similar if we use reserves in terms of M2. The results are available under request. 
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We certainly do not claim any causality through these results. Moreover, our division 
on reserve groups could be masking an alternative differentiation. Although our next step is to 
control for additional factors that could explain the observed behavior of both reserves and 
gross capital flows within a panel data model, we close this section running an event analysis 
where countries are divided according to their exchange rate regime. We use this specific 
variable as one would expect that countries with fixed or quasi-fixed exchange rate regimes 
will need more international reserves than countries with a flexible exchange rate. Table 6 
presents statistics on the number of observations of the various exchange rate regimes 
comprised within each reserve group. Both fixed and flexible regimes are significantly present 
in all of our reserve groups. 
Low reserves
Medium  
reserves High reserves Total
Peg 149 452 191 792
Managed 262 748 246 1,256
Flexible 209 515 98 822
Total 620 1,715 535 2,870
Low reserves
Medium  
reserves High reserves Total
Peg 101 600 91 792
Managed 259 717 264 1,240
Flexible 247 440 146 833
Reserves over IFL
Reserves over M2
Table 6. Reserve quantiles and Exchange rate regimes
 
Tables 7 and 8, in the Appendix, shows the results of the event analysis when 
emerging countries are divided in three exchange rate regime groups. One with fixed 
exchange rate countries, another one with managed exchange rate and a final group 
containing flexible exchange rate countries. The results show that the behavior of gross flows 
in fixed exchange rate countries is rather similar to the one observed for high and medium 
reserve countries. Comfortingly, we do not observe a clear similarity between the behavior of 
gross flows in low reserves countries and in flexible exchange rate countries, implying that 
diving countries according to their level of international reserves or their exchange rate regime 
provides different information.19 
To sum up, gross capital flows dynamics around periods of financial stress are 
relatively similar for OECD countries and non-OECD countries with high reserves. As regards 
GFI, there is a reduction common to all four groups under analysis. However, we found 
interesting heterogeneity in the response of residents in non-OECD countries.  In medium and 
especially low reserves countries the reduction in GFI is not compensated by a similar 
reduction of GDO. Indeed, for low reserves countries, instead of retrenching, domestic 
outflows become even higher than in normal times. As just argued, while this is robust 
evidence of the existence of significant differences in gross flows behavior in our various 
country groups, it does not preclude that this co-movement is due to other economic factors. 
That is, we cannot claim causality. We address this issue in the following section where we 
asses if this relation is robust to the inclusion of other economic factors likely to affect the 
behavior of both international reserves and gross capital flows. Given our focus on the role of 
reserves, in what follows we will focus on non-OECD countries only. 
                                                                          
19. Indeed, as shown in Bastourre et al. (2009), is far from clear that fixed rate countries accumulate more reserves. 
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3.2 A panel data approach 
In this section we test the robustness of our previous findings by considering a number of 
determinants of the behavior of gross capital flows through a panel data analysis. As there is 
no agreed benchmark where to study the determinants of gross capital flows, we extend  
the analysis in Cowan et al. (2007) and Broner et al. (2011). Our baseline model includes the 
country’s credit rating, the growth rate of GDP, the current account, the exchange rate 
regime, the VIX and the EMBI spread as controls. More specifically, we estimate the following 
equation: 
(3) ݔො௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߠ௜ ൅ ߩíݐ ൅ ߜݕ௜௧ିଵ ൅א௜௧ 
 
As explanatory variables we include a constant, α; country fixed-effects ߠ௜; country-
specific time trends, ߩíݐ, and a vector ݕ௜௧ିଵ that collects the set of (pre-determined) economic 
controls. We further augment this model to include ܧܸܧܰܶ ௧ܲ,  a binary variable taking value 1 
in the quarter of the financial shock and in each of the four subsequent quarters and zero 
otherwise, among the economic controls in ݕ௜௧ିଵ.20  
When then extend the model to include our reserve group indicators, ܪܴ, ܯܴ and 
ܮܴ, and their interactions with the ܧܸܧܰܶ ௧ܲ  indicator, defined as ̃ݖு, ̃ݖெ  and ̃ݖ௅, respectively. 
(4) ݔො௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߠ௜ ൅ ߩíݐ ൅ ߜݕ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߲ுܪܴ ൅ ߲ெܯܴ ൅ ߚு ̃ݖு  ൅ ߚெ ̃ݖெ  ൅ ߚ௅ ̃ݖ௅  ൅א௜௧ 
 
The simultaneous introduction of reserves indicators, the stress indicator and the 
interaction of both allows us to interpret the ߚ coefficients as the specific relation between 
reserves and ݔො௜௧ during periods of financial stress. 
We conduct further robustness tests.21 First, given that our construction of the 
reserve groups was done in a somehow arbitrary way, we modify our model and introduce 
our continuous measures of international reserve holdings, RIFL and RM2.22 Finally, emerging 
economies are viewed as an asset-class. This, as argued by Forbes and Warnock (2011), 
makes contagion highly likely. To correct for the potential biases that the presence of cross-
sectional correlation could create, we modify our estimation procedure and use the Driscoll-
Kraay estimator.23  
3.3 Main results from the panel analysis 
Table 9 shows the results for gross foreign inflows (GFI) and gross domestic outflows (GDO) 
using our low, medium and high reserves grouping. Tables 10 and 11 provide the results for 
GFI and GDO using the continuous measures of reserves. Finally, Table 12 shows the results 
for short-term gross foreign inflows (GFIST), and short-term gross domestic outflows 
(GDOST) using the continuous reserve indicators. For all the specifications we report the 
regressions results for reserves measured both in terms of foreign liabilities and in terms of 
domestic monetary aggregates (M2). 
 
                                                                          
20. We chose four quarters so as to match the window analyzed in the event analysis. 
21. All of our results regarding international reserves are insensitive to the inclusion of additional macroeconomic 
variables. For that reason we present only the result with the larger set of additional controls. 
22. As discussed below, given the results obtained using the dummy indicators, we include also a quadratic term to 
control for potential non-linear effects. 
23. Additionally, in order to assess to what extent the results are driven by the most recent global crisis, we also 
estimated the model excluding it. The results, unreported but available under request, were qualitatively identical.  
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Table 9 shows that in the benchmark model (columns 1 and 2), GFI is positively 
associated to higher ratings and GDP growth, and negatively correlated with the current 
account and the EMBI Index. There is no significant correlation with either the VIX or the 
exchange rate regime indicators. As regards gross domestic outflows, only GDP growth, 
which affects positively GDO, and the EMBI and VIX indices, both affecting negatively gross 
domestic outflows, have a significant relation with the behavior of resident investors. These 
results, which highlight the pro-cyclicality of gross flows, are similar to those in Broner et al. 
(2011).24 Interestingly, when the model is expanded to include our crisis indicator, ܧܸܧܰܶ ௧ܲ, 
the results remain unaffected.25 The coefficient associated with the crisis indicator is, as 
expected negative and highly significant. Finally, columns 3 and 4 provide the result when the 
model is further augmented to include our reserve-group indicators and their interacting with 
the crisis dummy.26 Column 3 presents the results when reserves are measured as a 
percentage of foreign liabilities and column 4 contains the results when reserves are 
measured in terms of M2. Focusing on the coefficients regarding the interaction of reserves 
and crises, there are two results that must be highlighted. First, GFO is not significantly 
affected by reserves, no matter if they are measured in terms of M2 or foreign liabilities. 
Second, there is seems to be a non-linear effect of reserves on gross domestic flows. Only for 
those countries in the intermediate level of reserves during periods of stress we observe a 
significant and negative coefficient. This result indicates that in medium reserve countries 
there is a significant reduction on the pattern of wealth accumulation abroad by residents. 
As a result of this non-linearity, but also motivated by our understanding that our grouping 
strategy, while necessary for conducting the event analysis, was to some extent arbitrary, we 
modify the model to include a continuous measure of reserves. We do so by including both a linear 
and non-linear (quadratic) terms. The results using the continuous measures are shown in Tables 
10 and 11. They present very similar coefficients for all of our macroeconomic controls both for GFI 
(Table 10) and for GDO (Table 11). Only when we modify the estimation technique and correct for 
potential cross-sectional correlation do the baseline results change (see columns DK5 and DK6 in 
Tables 10 and 11). As regards GFI (Table 10), once we control for cross-sectional correlation, the 
exchange rate regime indicators become significant. In turn, the estimates for GDO (Table 11) 
show that the current account affects significantly the behavior of domestic investors while the 
GDP growth stops having a significant effect. 
The results for the continuous reserve indicators are the following. For gross foreign 
inflows, once again we hardly find any evidence of reserves affecting their behavior. Only 
when a non-linear term is added and reserves are measured in terms of foreign liabilities  
we find that having very large reserves seem to accompany a relatively smaller drop in 
external financing. This result is present both for our fixed effects estimation and when we use 
the Driscoll-Kraay correction. In turn, the results for domestic outflows (Table 11) confirm the 
results using the reserve grouping. We find a significant non-linear effect of reserves to GDO. 
Moreover, the negative-linear and positive-quadratic coefficients indicate that while there is a 
beneficial effect of accumulating reserves (negative linear term), this effect vanishes for too 
high values (negative-quadratic term). Comfortingly, this result is robust to measuring reserves 
in terms of M2 or foreign liabilities. It is also robust to using a fixed effect estimator or a model 
that corrects for cross-country correlation. 
                                                                          
24. Our results are also in line with those in Forbes and Warnock (2011) who, focusing on extreme 
movements on gross flows, find that while global factors strongly affect both residents and foreigners’ 
behavior, domestic macroeconomic factors are most related to foreign capital flows. 
25. Only the significance of the EMBI index for GDO falls. 
26. As the reserve dummies were included to guarantee a correct interpretation of the interaction between 
the dummies and our stress indicator we abstain from discussing those results. 
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Finally, as shown in Table 12, the effects of reserve accumulation are stronger for 
short term capital flows. For short term domestic outflows we find the same non-linear 
relation that we documented for GDO. As regards short term foreign inflows, when measuring 
reserves in terms of foreign liabilities we find a non-linear relation which is exactly the opposite 
of the one we find for domestic flows. This can be interpreted as indicating that it takes a  
lot of reserve accumulation to really see a positive effect on foreign investors’ behavior vis-à-
vis the economy. An additional remarkable result is that domestic short term outflows do not 
seem to have a cyclical behavior. 
To sum up, our panel estimation results confirm the significance of the various 
channels identified through the event analysis. These results show that international reserves 
might be relevant during financial stress in a somewhat unexpected way. While they do not 
seem to strongly affect the behavior of foreign investors, they help reduce financial investment 
overseas by residents, compensating somewhat the fall of investment from overseas. 
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4 Conclusions 
In this paper we characterize the dynamics of gross capital flows around periods of global 
financial stress and relate them to the countries’ holdings of international reserves. In contrast 
to previous contributions focusing on net flows, we delve into gross capital inflows and 
outflows. 
Our event analysis highlights differences across countries in financial flow dynamics 
around periods of global financial stress. In OECD countries foreign inflows and domestic 
outflows contract in a systemic way. Conversely, in non-OECD countries, while financial 
inflows do fall no matter what the level of reserves, domestic outflow dynamics change 
depending on international reserve holdings. In high-reserve countries domestic outflows are 
significantly lower during financial stress while in low-reserve countries there is no such 
retrenchment, and we even find signs of capital flight. This led us to hypothesize, in line with 
Obtsfeld et al. (2008), that reserves play a catalytic role also vis-à-vis resident investors. 
We further assess the robustness of these results using panel data model where 
additional controls can be added. In line with Cowan et al. (2007) and Broner et al. (2011), our 
results suggest that capital flows are pro-cyclical. Our results suggest that country-specific 
variables are less important in explaining gross domestic outflows than global factors. This 
finding is closely related to Forbes and Warnock (2011), who show that domestic capital flight 
seems to be driven by global factors, while capital flight is also significantly affected  
by domestic macroeconomic factors. Thus, our panel results provide evidence on the 
robustness of the evidence obtained through the event analysis: international reserves are 
associated with a higher propensity of resident investors to repatriate capital invested abroad 
during periods of global stress. Cowan et al. (2007) and Broner et al. (2011) document that, 
on average, domestic capital retrenches during crises, a result in contrast to the notion of 
recurrent domestic capital flight documented in Forbes and Warnock (2011) and Rothenberg 
and Warnock (2011). Our results show that taking into account the stock of reserves held by 
the Central Bank is one way to reconcile these two sets of results. Countries with low 
reserves are more likely to see their residents place their capital abroad during crises.  
The opposite happens when a country’s Central Bank has an abundant stock of reserves.  
We believe this is an important result that should be considered when modeling international 
capital flows. 
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Appendix 
Data description 
Financial flows: 
Data comes from IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS). The variables used to compute 
gross financial outflows are Direct Investment Abroad (line 78 bdd), Portfolio Investment 
Assets (line 78 bfd), Other Investment Assets (line 78 bwd) and Changes in reserves (line 79 
dbd). On the other hand, gross financial inflows include Direct Investment in the Reporting 
Economy (line 78 bed), Portfolio Investment Liabilities (line 78 bgd) and Other Investment 
Liabilities (line 78 bid). 
International financial liabilities & M2: 
We construct data on international financial liabilities mixing the updated version of the 
External Wealth of Nations Mark II database (Lane and MiIlesi-Ferretti, 2007) with data from 
IFS. We consider the first source more reliable for earlier dates. Data, on an annual basis,  
was interpolated to obtain quarterly figures. In terms of IFS coding, the variables employed 
are International financial liabilities (line 79 lad) and reserve assets (line 79 akd). We measure 
of M2 as the sum of lines 34 and 35, from International Financial Statistics. 
Data on financial spreads and credit ratings 
We use the JP Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) Global (less liquid but more 
diversified than the EMBI+), which is a traditional, market-capitalization-weighted index.  
The credit ratings were obtained from Standard & Poor’s. 
Countries under study: 
OECD countries: Australia; Austria; Canada; Denmark; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Italy; 
Japan; Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; Portugal; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; UK; US.27 
Non-OECD countries: Argentina; Armenia; Azerbaijan; Bangladesh; Belarus; Bosnia-
Herzegovina; Brazil; Bulgaria; Cambodia; Colombia; Croatia; Czech Rep; Chile; Ecuador; 
Estonia; Georgia; Hungary; India; Indonesia; Israel; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Korea; Latvia; 
Lithuania; Macedonia; Malaysia; Mexico, Moldova; Morocco; Pakistan; Peru; Philippines; 
Poland; Romania; Russian Federation; Singapore; Slovak Rep.; Slovenia; South Africa; 
Thailand; Turkey; Uruguay; Venezuela. 
Exchange rate regime: 
Exchange rates regimes are classified using the Reinhart and Ilzetki (2008) classification. This 
classification takes four values, from 1 to 4, being 1 the most fixed regimes and 4 the most 
flexible. We regroup them in three groups: a “fixed exchange rate regime” group comprising 
observations with a value 1; a “managed exchange rate regime group”, comprising observations 
with values 2 and 3; a “flexible exchange rate regime”, comprising observations with a value 4. 
 
                                                                          
27. Given their recent adherence to the club and different level of development, we excluded Chile, Mexico, and Korea 
from the OECD group. 
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Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
Low reserves 4,84 2,62 9,39 10,59 3,29 16,19
Medium reserves 17,52 10,21 29,06 28,31 16,39 39,91
High reserves 35,33 29,16 49,83 64,71 51,43 87,28
OECD1 10,28 2,01 31,51 12,46 1,48 33,09
Low reserves 6,17 2,41 10,39 12,24 2,66 18,96
Medium reserves 17,22 11,21 23,06 37,96 21,28 63,36
High reserves 31,07 23,44 41,74 103,27 67,02 162,35
OECD1 
8,71 0,90 32,16 12,89 1,39 33,44
Low reserves 7,86 3,62 10,69 14,89 6,85 19,81
Medium reserves 17,56 10,84 25,69 39,61 21,40 63,95
High reserves 33,42 28,72 41,37 88,35 65,60 117,83
OECD1 6,77 0,75 29,08 14,45 0,97 35,75
Low reserves 9,93 1,36 13,42 20,76 12,97 23,50
Medium reserves 23,65 13,65 39,32 37,83 25,23 54,37
High reserves 53,24 40,00 76,24 69,25 57,99 80,80
OECD1 
5,08 0,13 31,11 11,54 0,71 33,21
Sources: IFS and authors' calculations.
1995Q1
1998Q3
2001Q4
2008Q4
Table 1
Reserves to financial liabilities Reserves to M2
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(1)          
Non OECD
(2)           
High 
reserves
(3)    
Medium 
reserves
(4)           
Low 
reserves
(5)           
OECD
Quarter t-4 0.347*** 0.348* 0.386*** 0.219 0.035
[0.093] [0.183] [0.097] [0.277] [0.098]
Quarter t-3 0.062 0.030 0.064 0.100 -0.024
[0.116] [0.319] [0.116] [0.289] [0.109]
Quarter t-2 -0.013 -0.057 -0.043 0.155 -0.021
[0.140] [0.357] [0.152] [0.269] [0.125]
Quarter t-1 -0.061 -0.147 -0.102 0.211 -0.041
[0.133] [0.345] [0.144] [0.261] [0.139]
Quarter Event -0.173 -0.132 -0.228 0.018 -0.037
[0.135] [0.348] [0.154] [0.200] [0.149]
Quarter t+1 -0.091 0.016 -0.115 -0.117 -0.054
[0.113] [0.262] [0.142] [0.223] [0.123]
Quarter t+2 -0.158* 0.047 -0.156 -0.438 -0.074
[0.091] [0.227] [0.113] [0.273] [0.128]
Quarter t+3 -0.201** 0.042 -0.208** -0.540** 0.038
[0.086] [0.167] [0.100] [0.263] [0.140]
Quarter t+4 -0.218** -0.065 -0.185* -0.527** 0.117
[0.083] [0.155] [0.100] [0.240] [0.126]
Observations 2028 2028 2028 2028 1350
R-squared 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.34
Number of countries 45 45 45 45 21
Wald Test 7.207 0.0202 6.635 3.928 0.0295
Sig 0.0102 0.888 0.0134 0.0537 0.865
Results in columns (2)-(4) were obtained from a unique regression. To facilitate the comprehension
of the results we present them in different columns.
Table 3
Event analysis. Net flows
The regressions include country-trends, country dummies and year dummies. Robust standard
errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Wald test is a Wald test of the change in the dynamics in the dependent variable. The null
hypothesis is no difference between the sum of the four coefficients β(j) before and after the event.
A rejection of the null hypothesis implies a significant change in the dynamics of the series under 
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(1)     
aaaaaaa     
Non OECD
(2)          
High 
reserves
(3)   
Medium 
reserves
(4)          
Low 
reserves
(5)     
aaaaaaa     
OECD
(1)     
aaaaaaa     
Non OECD
(2)          
High 
reserves
(3)   
Medium 
reserves
(4)          
Low 
reserves
(5)     
aaaaaaa     
OECD
Quarter t-4 0.388*** 0.407** 0.366*** 0.443* 0.410*** 0.107 0.155 -0.016 0.472* 0.420***
[0.079] [0.163] [0.087] [0.243] [0.086] [0.078] [0.156] [0.085] [0.273] [0.082]
Quarter t-3 0.017 0.028 -0.001 0.064 0.246** -0.055 -0.031 -0.096 0.085 0.281***
[0.100] [0.305] [0.108] [0.247] [0.097] [0.083] [0.195] [0.099] [0.209] [0.093]
Quarter t-2 -0.047 -0.192 -0.062 0.122 0.066 -0.061 -0.146 -0.034 -0.048 0.082
[0.116] [0.257] [0.139] [0.255] [0.084] [0.092] [0.152] [0.112] [0.249] [0.080]
Quarter t-1 -0.090 -0.245 -0.147 0.217 -0.117 -0.112 -0.180 -0.146 0.103 -0.098
[0.120] [0.278] [0.143] [0.209] [0.106] [0.098] [0.204] [0.117] [0.261] [0.082]
Quarter Event -0.282** -0.335 -0.308** -0.161 -0.467*** -0.176** -0.420** -0.168 0.136 -0.418***
[0.116] [0.300] [0.136] [0.248] [0.114] [0.086] [0.169] [0.112] [0.195] [0.096]
Quarter t+1 -0.380*** -0.591** -0.350*** -0.284 -0.249* -0.429*** -0.781*** -0.464*** 0.197 -0.205*
[0.092] [0.236] [0.109] [0.299] [0.120] [0.088] [0.188] [0.106] [0.168] [0.104]
Quarter t+2 -0.401*** -0.433** -0.361*** -0.490 -0.250** -0.381*** -0.685*** -0.483*** 0.438** -0.204*
[0.076] [0.192] [0.082] [0.303] [0.109] [0.096] [0.189] [0.125] [0.164] [0.101]
Quarter t+3 -0.385*** -0.369** -0.335*** -0.555** -0.170 -0.329*** -0.681*** -0.376*** 0.362 -0.205**
[0.075] [0.163] [0.105] [0.247] [0.118] [0.093] [0.138] [0.120] [0.229] [0.096]
Quarter t+4 -0.333*** -0.298 -0.276** -0.528** -0.161 -0.267*** -0.486** -0.372*** 0.408** -0.253**
[0.076] [0.191] [0.108] [0.231] [0.101] [0.092] [0.199] [0.123] [0.185] [0.100]
Observations 2196 2196 2196 2196 1350 2073 2073 2073 2073 1350
R-squared 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.41 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.41
Number of countries 45 45 45 45 21 45 45 45 45 21
Wald Test 25.86 3.881 14.59 4.577 17.70 12.05 21.04 7.940 0.834 15.73
Sig 0.0000 0.0552 0.0004 0.0380 0.0004 0.0012 0.0000 0.0072 0.3660 0.0008
Table 4
Event analysis. Gross Flows
The regressions include country-trends, country dummies and year dummies. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Wald test is a Wald test of the change in the dynamics in the dependent variable. The null hypothesis is no difference between the sum of the four coefficients β(j)
before and after the event. A rejection of the null hypothesis implies a significant changes in the dynamics of the series under scrutiny. Results in columns (2), (3)
and (4) were obtained from a unique regression. To facilitate the comprehension of the results we present them in different columns.
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(1)     
aaaaaaa     
Non OECD
(2)          
High 
reserves
(3)   
Medium 
reserves
(4)          
Low 
reserves
(5)     
aaaaaaa     
OECD
(1)     
aaaaaaa     
Non OECD
(2)          
High 
reserves
(3)   
Medium 
reserves
(4)          
Low 
reserves
(5)     
aaaaaaa     
OECD
Quarter t-4 0.312*** 0.392** 0.311*** 0.264 0.238*** 0.067 0.111 -0.065 0.464* 0.265***
[0.075] [0.192] [0.087] [0.207] [0.078] [0.076] [0.148] [0.090] [0.237] [0.085]
Quarter t-3 -0.117 -0.182 -0.115 -0.064 0.093 -0.085 -0.062 -0.171 0.210 0.105
[0.091] [0.333] [0.098] [0.223] [0.080] [0.081] [0.191] [0.109] [0.191] [0.100]
Quarter t-2 -0.170 -0.343 -0.157 -0.065 -0.060 -0.064 -0.164 -0.123 0.256 -0.082
[0.105] [0.314] [0.130] [0.227] [0.098] [0.100] [0.147] [0.120] [0.281] [0.090]
Quarter t-1 -0.202 -0.418 -0.241 0.095 -0.221* -0.114 -0.153 -0.237* 0.367 -0.262**
[0.122] [0.348] [0.148] [0.194] [0.115] [0.108] [0.204] [0.123] [0.273] [0.093]
Quarter Event -0.402*** -0.633** -0.394** -0.226 -0.514*** -0.162 -0.428** -0.223* 0.385* -0.568***
[0.120] [0.283] [0.148] [0.218] [0.115] [0.100] [0.178] [0.123] [0.202] [0.095]
Quarter t+1 -0.496*** -0.724*** -0.484*** -0.332 -0.325** -0.357*** -0.800*** -0.453*** 0.536*** -0.328***
[0.102] [0.231] [0.121] [0.269] [0.127] [0.102] [0.195] [0.106] [0.163] [0.096]
Quarter t+2 -0.477*** -0.593*** -0.440*** -0.483* -0.341*** -0.343*** -0.721*** -0.478*** 0.606*** -0.278**
[0.086] [0.204] [0.094] [0.270] [0.117] [0.103] [0.210] [0.130] [0.151] [0.111]
Quarter t+3 -0.466*** -0.566*** -0.410*** -0.536** -0.315** -0.275*** -0.721*** -0.342*** 0.534** -0.261**
[0.081] [0.180] [0.107] [0.237] [0.113] [0.097] [0.152] [0.123] [0.251] [0.109]
Quarter t+4 -0.389*** -0.433* -0.320*** -0.544** -0.353*** -0.215** -0.484** -0.345*** 0.581** -0.329***
[0.076] [0.218] [0.099] [0.210] [0.103] [0.093] [0.207] [0.122] [0.217] [0.107]
Observations 2196 2196 2196 2196 1350 2122 2122 2122 2122 1350
R-squared 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.41 0.28 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.40
Number of countries 45 45 45 45 21 45 45 45 45 21
Wald test 22.31 3.572 13.87 3.119 15.53 6.257 20.25 3.587 1.110 7.797
Sig 0.0000 0.0654 0.0006 0.0843 0.0008 0.0162 0.0000 0.0648 0.298 0.0112
Table 5
Foreign Domestic
The regressions include country-trends, country dummies and year dummies. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Wald test is a Wald test of the change in the dynamics in the dependent variable. The null hypothesis is no difference between the sum of the four coefficients β(j)
before and after the event. A rejection of the null hypothesis implies a significant changes in the dynamics of the series under scrutiny. Results in columns (2), (3)
and (4) were obtained from a unique regression. To facilitate the comprehension of the results we present them in different columns.
Event analysis. Gross flows, short-term
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(1)           
Non‐OECD
(2)          
PEG
(3) 
MANAGED
(4)    
FLEXIBLE
(5)         
OECD
(1)           
Non‐OECD
(2)         
PEG
(3) 
MANAGED
(4)    
FLEXIBLE
(5)         
OECD
Quarter t-4 0.381*** 0.382* 0.385*** 0.376*** 0.410*** 0.062 0.445*** -0.095 -0.078 0.420***
[0.077] [0.203] [0.120] [0.136] [0.086] [0.077] [0.163] [0.109] [0.113] [0.082]
Quarter t-3 0.307*** 0.322 0.337*** 0.251 0.246** -0.010 0.348** -0.124 -0.178 0.281***
[0.092] [0.224] [0.119] [0.185] [0.097] [0.080] [0.151] [0.106] [0.128] [0.093]
Quarter t-2 0.201* 0.239 0.275** 0.053 0.066 -0.074 0.098 -0.128 -0.158 0.082
[0.105] [0.210] [0.125] [0.227] [0.084] [0.091] [0.148] [0.123] [0.172] [0.080]
Quarter t-1 0.116 0.208 0.144 -0.011 -0.117 -0.174* -0.098 -0.228 -0.165 -0.098
[0.109] [0.172] [0.122] [0.252] [0.106] [0.097] [0.179] [0.143] [0.178] [0.082]
Quarter Event -0.258** -0.18 -0.181 -0.449 -0.467*** -0.402*** -0.530*** -0.365** -0.341* -0.418***
[0.110] [0.158] [0.122] [0.282] [0.114] [0.093] [0.166] [0.144] [0.199] [0.096]
Quarter t+1 -0.294*** -0.311** -0.188 -0.446* -0.249* -0.423*** -0.670*** -0.494*** -0.151 -0.205*
[0.092] [0.140] [0.122] [0.253] [0.120] [0.084] [0.177] [0.120] [0.179] [0.104]
Quarter t+2 -0.353*** -0.388** -0.274** -0.451** -0.250** -0.411*** -0.629*** -0.494*** -0.127 -0.204*
[0.073] [0.180] [0.113] [0.198] [0.109] [0.096] [0.215] [0.120] [0.208] [0.101]
Quarter t+3 -0.350*** -0.331* -0.239* -0.533*** -0.17 -0.345*** -0.484** -0.446*** -0.108 -0.205**
[0.071] [0.171] [0.129] [0.165] [0.118] [0.096] [0.191] [0.130] [0.193] [0.096]
Quarter t+4 -0.298*** -0.355* -0.162 -0.458*** -0.161 -0.317*** -0.217 -0.434*** -0.24 -0.253**
[0.070] [0.185] [0.132] [0.154] [0.101] [0.091] [0.203] [0.125] [0.176] [0.100]
Observations 2336 2336 2336 2336 1350 2201 2201 2201 2201 1350
R-squared 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.41 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.41
Number of id 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 21.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 21.00
Country-trend Dummies No No No No No No No No No No
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of countries 46 46 46 46 21 46 46 46 46 21
Test -1 47.46 7.408 19.24 31.48 17.7 10.59 10.15 6.529 0.00287 15.73
Sig 0.0000 0.0092 0.0001 0.0000 0.0004 0.0022 0.0026 0.0141 0.9570 0.0008
The regressions include country-trends, country dummies and year dummies. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Test-1 is a Wald test
of the change in the dynamics in the dependent variable. The null hypothesis is no difference between the sum of the four coefficients β(j) before and after the event. A
rejection of the null hypothesis implies a significant changes in the dynamics of the series under scrutiny. Exchange rate regimes in emerging economies are classified
with the Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2008) classification: “ peg “ includes countries with a regime equal to 1; “managed” includes countries with regimes equal to
2 and 3: “flexible”, countries with regimes equal to 4. Results in columns (2) ,(3), and (4) were obtained from a unique regression. To facilitate the comprehension
of the  results we present them in different columns.
Table 7
Event analysis by exchange rate regime. Gross Flows
Foreign Domestic
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(1)          
Non‐OECD
(2)          
PEG
(3) 
MANAGED
(4)    
FLEXIBLE
(5)         
OECD
(1)           
Non‐OECD
(2)           
PEG
(3) 
MANAGED
(4)    
FLEXIBLE
(5)         
OECD
Quarter t-4 0.335*** 0.296 0.397*** 0.283* 0.238*** 0.017 0.363** -0.122 -0.115 0.265***
[0.075] [0.187] [0.115] [0.145] [0.078] [0.074] [0.143] [0.111] [0.099] [0.085]
Quarter t-3 0.215** 0.114 0.333*** 0.128 0.093 -0.097 0.230* -0.197* -0.263** 0.105
[0.091] [0.201] [0.119] [0.185] [0.080] [0.075] [0.124] [0.108] [0.116] [0.100]
Quarter t-2 0.102 0.066 0.276** -0.136 -0.06 -0.113 0.021 -0.187 -0.125 -0.082
[0.099] [0.177] [0.117] [0.220] [0.098] [0.088] [0.147] [0.119] [0.177] [0.090]
Quarter t-1 0.025 0.063 0.153 -0.209 -0.221* -0.213** -0.185 -0.282** -0.13 -0.262**
[0.110] [0.132] [0.116] [0.247] [0.115] [0.093] [0.171] [0.138] [0.186] [0.093]
Quarter Event -0.358*** -0.317*** -0.202 -0.638** -0.514*** -0.421*** -0.624*** -0.371** -0.3 -0.568***
[0.110] [0.109] [0.128] [0.273] [0.115] [0.096] [0.141] [0.150] [0.220] [0.095]
Quarter t+1 -0.381*** -0.294* -0.210* -0.702*** -0.325** -0.371*** -0.638*** -0.487*** -0.016 -0.328***
[0.102] [0.160] [0.125] [0.249] [0.127] [0.092] [0.163] [0.131] [0.195] [0.096]
Quarter t+2 -0.414*** -0.417** -0.311** -0.566*** -0.341*** -0.366*** -0.588*** -0.455*** -0.075 -0.278**
[0.087] [0.167] [0.135] [0.208] [0.117] [0.103] [0.218] [0.131] [0.213] [0.111]
Quarter t+3 -0.442*** -0.372** -0.346** -0.634*** -0.315** -0.312*** -0.465** -0.386*** -0.107 -0.261**
[0.080] [0.169] [0.144] [0.161] [0.113] [0.094] [0.202] [0.137] [0.170] [0.109]
Quarter t+4 -0.389*** -0.316 -0.277** -0.604*** -0.353*** -0.267*** -0.186 -0.398*** -0.149 -0.329***
[0.074] [0.197] [0.134] [0.145] [0.103] [0.095] [0.211] [0.128] [0.178] [0.107]
Observations 2336 2336 2336 2336 1350 2259 2259 2259 2259 1350
R-squared 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.41 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.4
Number of countries 46 46 46 46 21 46 46 46 46 21
Wald test 41.72 4.307 19.32 20.9 15.53 5.301 7.329 2.892 0.128 7.797
Sig 0.0000 0.0437 0.0001 0.0000 0.0008 0.0260 0.0096 0.0959 0.7220 0.0112
Table 8
Event analysis by exchange rate regime. Gross flows, short-term 
Foreign Domestic
The regressions include country-trends, country dummies and year dummies. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Wald test is a
Wald test of the change in the dynamics in the dependent variable. The null hypothesis is no difference between the sum of the four coefficients β (j) before and
after the event. A rejection of the null hypothesis implies a significant changes in the dynamics of the series under scrutiny. Exchange rate regimes in emerging
economies are classified with the Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2008) classification: “ peg “ includes countries with a regime equal to 1; “managed” includes
countries with regimes equal to 2 and 3: “flexible”, countries with regimes equal to 4. Results in columns (2) ,(3), and (4) were obtained from a unique
regression.  To  facilitate  the comprehension  of the  results we present them in different columns.
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1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Current account -0.098*** -0.099*** -0.105*** -0.104*** -0.007 -0.008 0.001 0.001
[0.012] [0.012] [0.014] [0.015] [0.014] [0.015] [0.014] [0.013]
Dummy peg 0.272 0.296 0.266 0.229 -0.257 -0.220 -0.144 -0.196
[0.297] [0.293] [0.294] [0.298] [0.255] [0.255] [0.219] [0.231]
Dummy managed exchange rate 0.176 0.189 0.175 0.176 -0.176 -0.155 -0.047 -0.111
[0.189] [0.196] [0.204] [0.204] [0.187] [0.187] [0.176] [0.175]
Sovereign rating 0.097*** 0.100*** 0.094*** 0.096*** -0.006 -0.004 0.011 -0.003
[0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.029] [0.032] [0.032] [0.030] [0.034]
GDP real growth 0.051*** 0.048*** 0.038*** 0.034*** 0.022** 0.018** 0.006 0.002
[0.009] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007]
EMBI global -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
VIX -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.019***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Dummy stress -0.202** -0.266***
[0.088] [0.097]
Dummy low reserves to FL, in stress -0.097 -0.084
[0.200] [0.182]
Dummy medium reserves to FL, in stress -0.103 -0.213**
[0.091] [0.104]
Dummy high reserves to FL, in stress -0.148 -0.091
[0.146] [0.194]
Dummy high reserves to FL 0.138 -0.567**
[0.186] [0.230]
Dummy medium reserves to FL 0.086 -0.204
[0.113] [0.133]
Dummy low reserves to M2, in stress -0.103 -0.068
[0.149] [0.176]
Dummy medium reserves to M2, in stress -0.080 -0.190*
[0.088] [0.105]
Dummy high reserves to M2, in stress -0.250 0.020
[0.181] [0.195]
Dummy high reserves to M2 0.422* -0.044
[0.218] [0.212]
Dummy medium reserves to M2 0.290*** 0.143
[0.105] [0.143]
Observations 1846 1846 1754 1747 1846 1846 1754 1747
R-squared 0.32 0.32 0.37 0.36 0.32 0.32 0.37 0.36
Number of countries 42 42 41 41 42 42 41 41
Foreign Domestic
The regressions include country-trends, country dummies and year dummies. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
Panel estimation. FE. Discrete analysis. Gross flows
Table 9
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FE 1 FE 2 FE 3 FE 4 DK 5 DK 6
Current account -0.110*** -0.111*** -0.109*** -0.109*** -0.094*** -0.089***
[0.013] [0.014] [0.016] [0.016] [0.006] [0.008]
Dummy peg 0.246 0.241 0.291 0.289 0.336*** 0.302**
[0.306] [0.306] [0.318] [0.319] [0.123] [0.129]
Dummy managed exchange rate 0.139 0.130 0.168 0.172 0.053 0.087
[0.204] [0.203] [0.218] [0.221] [0.092] [0.079]
Sovereign rating 0.087*** 0.086*** 0.100*** 0.101*** 0.106*** 0.109***
[0.028] [0.029] [0.027] [0.028] [0.012] [0.012]
GDP real growth 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.027* 0.027* 0.033*** 0.024**
[0.013] [0.013] [0.014] [0.014] [0.010] [0.010]
EMBI global -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
VIX -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 0.000 -0.001
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.006]
Dummy stress 0.086 -0.263 -0.095 -0.146 -0.146 0.027
[0.172] [0.303] [0.149] [0.296] [0.229] [0.256]
Reserves to FL, stress -0.010 0.026 0.022
[0.007] [0.023] [0.016]
Reserves to FL^2, stress -0.001* -0.001**
[0.000] [0.000]
Reserves to FL 0.019** 0.015 -0.025
[0.009] [0.021] [0.015]
Reserves to FL^2 0.000 0.001**
[0.000] [0.000]
Reserves to M2, stress 0.001 0.003 -0.003
[0.003] [0.014] [0.009]
Reserves to M2^2, stress -0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000]
Reserves to M2 0.017*** 0.013 -0.009
[0.005] [0.011] [0.007]
Reserves to M2^2 0.000 0.000**
[0.000] [0.000]
Observations 1809 1809 1805 1805 1809 1805
R-squared 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.53
Country-trend Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Number of countries 40 40 40 40 40 40
Table 10
Panel estimation. Continuous measures. Gross foreign flows
The regressions include country dummies and year dummies. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** 
Columns FE1-FE4 are fixed effect estimations; columns DK5 and DK6 use the Driskoll-Kraay estimator, which
corrects for potential cross-sectional dependence.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 33 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1211 
 
 
 
 
  
FE 1 FE 2 FE 3 FE 4 DK5 DK6
Current account 0.006 0.007 0.004 0.005 0.016** 0.016**
[0.014] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.007] [0.007]
Dummy peg -0.113 -0.105 -0.252 -0.241 0.030 -0.072
[0.205] [0.204] [0.210] [0.206] [0.155] [0.176]
Dummy managed exchange rate -0.019 -0.009 -0.098 -0.091 -0.127 -0.204**
[0.178] [0.178] [0.172] [0.175] [0.084] [0.084]
Sovereign rating 0.026 0.026 -0.001 -0.002 0.038** 0.020
[0.030] [0.027] [0.031] [0.031] [0.019] [0.019]
GDP real growth 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001 -0.006 -0.006
[0.008] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007]
EMBI global -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.000 -0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
VIX -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.015***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Dummy stress -0.107 0.354 0.050 0.583* 0.434** 0.760***
[0.205] [0.234] [0.149] [0.325] [0.202] [0.261]
Reserves to FL, stress -0.000 -0.046** -0.050***
[0.009] [0.020] [0.012]
Reserves to FL^2, stress 0.001** 0.001***
[0.000] [0.000]
Reserves to FL -0.034*** -0.026 -0.024
[0.012] [0.027] [0.015]
Reserves to FL^2 -0.000 -0.000
[0.000] [0.000]
Reserves to M2, stress -0.005* -0.034* -0.040***
[0.003] [0.017] [0.011]
Reserves to M2^2, stress 0.000* 0.000***
[0.000] [0.000]
Reserves to M2 -0.009 -0.005 -0.014***
[0.006] [0.016] [0.004]
Reserves to M2^2 -0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000]
Observations 1719 1719 1715 1715 1719 1715
R-squared 0.39 0.39 0.37 0.38
Country-trend Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Number of groups 41 41 41 41 41 41
Columns FE1-FE4 are fixed effect estimations; columns DK5 and DK 6 use the Driskoll-Kraay estimator, which
corrects for potential cross-sectional dependence.
Table 11
Panel estimation. Continuous measures. Gross domestic flows
The regressions include country dummies and year dummies. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** 
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FE 1 FE 1 DK 3 DK 4 FE 1 FE 1 DK 3 DK 4
Current account -0.107*** -0.102*** -0.089*** -0.081*** 0.017 0.015 0.020*** 0.019***
[0.017] [0.019] [0.008] [0.009] [0.015] [0.014] [0.007] [0.007]
Dummy peg 0.395 0.428 0.617*** 0.571*** -0.247 -0.394* 0.044 -0.059
[0.269] [0.259] [0.124] [0.128] [0.203] [0.201] [0.163] [0.189]
Dummy managed exchange rate 0.192 0.230 0.180* 0.213** -0.109 -0.198 -0.122 -0.205**
[0.197] [0.211] [0.098] [0.083] [0.185] [0.180] [0.086] [0.090]
Sovereign rating 0.074*** 0.094*** 0.099*** 0.107*** 0.029 0.000 0.023 0.002
[0.025] [0.022] [0.012] [0.012] [0.024] [0.028] [0.018] [0.018]
GDP real growth 0.040*** 0.035** 0.038*** 0.032*** 0.002 -0.001 -0.005 -0.004
[0.014] [0.015] [0.009] [0.010] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
EMBI global -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
VIX -0.004 -0.006* -0.002 -0.003 -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.018***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005]
Dummy stress -0.313 -0.306 -0.212 -0.097 0.436* 0.637* 0.457** 0.824***
[0.281] [0.261] [0.193] [0.295] [0.239] [0.342] [0.171] [0.273]
Reserves to FL, stress 0.029 0.025** -0.050** -0.051***
[0.021] [0.011] [0.022] [0.015]
Reserves to FL^2, stress -0.001** -0.001*** 0.001* 0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Reserves to FL 0.031 -0.014 -0.036 -0.018
[0.024] [0.012] [0.026] [0.013]
Reserves to FL^2 -0.000 0.000** 0.000 -0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Reserves to M2, stress 0.011 0.003 -0.037* -0.043***
[0.012] [0.010] [0.019] [0.014]
Reserves to M2^2, stress -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Reserves to M2 0.023* -0.001 -0.008 -0.016***
[0.012] [0.008] [0.016] [0.005]
Reserves to M2^2 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 1809 1805 1809 1805 Yes Yes No No
R-squared 0.51 0.50 1730 1726 1730 1726
Country-trend Dummies Yes Yes No No 0.33 0.31
Number of countries 40 40 40 40 41 41 41 41
Panel estimation. Continuous measures. Gross short-term flows
Table 12
The regressions include country dummies and year dummies. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.Columns FE1 and
FE2 are fixed effect estimations; columns DK3 and DK 4 use the Driskoll-Kraay estimator, which corrects for potential cross-sectional dependence.
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